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NOTES AND COMMENT

reviewing the exercise of the more debatable powers of the OPA.,
i.e., those enforced without express statutory authorization.
In our opinion one danger lurks in the practise of the grinding out
of'numberless rules and regulations. These affect so many of our people
that each day sees the citizen innocently violating one or more of
them. Of course it is highly impracticable to punish each and every
violator, so OPA, assuming a common sense attitude, has not attempted to do so. But here lies the danger. "Though the law itself
be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, if it is applied and
administered by public authority... so as to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, the denial
of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." >
In conclusion, it may be said that the OPA, born of necessity,
through executive order and directive, and later sanctioned by statute,
must be viewed in the light of the times in which it was enacted.
It is wartime legislation. As such, we must consider it from the
viewpoint of the objective to be attained-namely, economic stabilization during a period of great emergency.. Upon the successful harnessing of economic forces at home depend our victories abroad.
ELEANOR

J.

FRANKE,

STEPHEN J. SMIRTI.

ESTOPPEL IN LIFE INSURANcE IN NEW YORK (N. Y. INS. LAW

§ 58)

The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been used to preclude
insurers from defending on the grounds of breach of condition, and
as a defense to insurers' actions to rescind for breach of condition.
The doctrine operates when "one party has by his representations
or his conduct induced the other party to a transaction to give him
an advantage which it would be against equity and good conscience
for him to assert. Then he will not be permitted in a court of
justice to avail himself of that advantage." 1
Two factors control estoppel. The first is the common law
parol evidence rule making inadmissible oral testimony to alter the
terms of a written contract.2 The second factor is New York Insurance Law § 58 3 providing that insurance policies must contain the
GYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. ed. 220 (1886).
'Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, 233, 236 (U. S.
1871).
2 See comment of Johnson, Ch. J., regarding Plumb
v. Cattaraugus Co.
Mut. Ins. Co., 18 N. Y. 392 (1858) as printed in VAxCE, INsURANcE (2d ed.)
497-501 for a vigorous defense of the parol evidence rule.
3 What cases commonly refer to as N. Y. INs. L. § 58 is now superseded
by N. Y. INs. L. §§ 142, 149 and 150. The original § 58 is found in c. 690 of
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entire contract; that applications not attached to the policy shall be
excluded from evidence ;4 and that only material misrepresentations
are grounds for avoidance. 5 This statute is not retroactive 0 and
applies only to life insurance policies 7 and not to accident 8 or burglary 9 or fraternal society policies 10 or reinstatements."
The following is a chart of New York life insurance cases listed
in chronological order where the doctrine of equitable estoppel was
invoked. A few of these cases deal with estoppel only indirectly,
but each has a vital bearing on our discussion. Although in insurance cases "estoppel is inextricably interwoven with waiver", 12 we
shall limit ourselves to estoppel. Each column describes an element
which courts should consider to reach a decision. However, not every
opinion devotes attention to every element.
[See Chart, page 50]
By far the most important fact in each case is whether the
application was attached to, or copied on the policy.1 3 Nowhere do
we find a case which excludes an attached application from evidence. 14
The application probes into the nature of the risk and misrepresentations therein often constitute a material breach of condition
precedent or fraud in the inducement of the insurance contract or
both. By statute, 15 such statements are never warranties. Clauses
in the policy likewise often constitute conditions precedent. For
the Laws of 1892; added to by Laws of 1906, c. 326; and revised by Laws of

1909, c. 33.
See 27 MCKINNEY, CONs. L. 89.
4 N. Y. INs. L. § 142(1) as amended Laws of 1940, c. 94. For exact citations of analogous laws in many other states see Hymen Knopf, N. Y. Ins.
L. § 58, 16 CORN. L. Q. 238, n.20.
5 N. Y. INs. L. § 149(2).
6 § 58 applies only to policies issued on or after January 1, 1907. See Perry
v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., 144 App. Div. 751, 129 N. Y. Supp. 751 (1911).
7 Minsker v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,, 254 N. Y. 333, 173 N. E. 4
(1930).
8

Baumann v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 225 N. Y. 480, 122 N. E. 629 (1919).

9 Satz v. Mass. Bonding Co., 243 N. Y. 385, 153 N. It. 844 (1926).
10 Garrett v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Har, 219 App. Div. 413, 219 N. Y.
Supp. 345 (1927).
11 N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 227 App. Div. 79, 236 N. Y. Supp. 659
(1929).
12 Stephen I. Langmaid, Waiver and Estoppel in Inmurance Law in California, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 1-41. For example, in Heffron v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 233 App. Div. 534 (1931) plaintiff-beneficiary proceeded on the theory
of waiver, although the elements of estoppel also existed.
13 N. Y. INs. L. § 142(1), ibid.
14 Case "j" in the chart is interesting in this respect for the admission of
the application is predicated on the assumption that it would have been attached
in due course to the policy if the insured had not died before the policy was
issued. The Bible case, "e" in chart, states: "Controversy is foreclosed if the
application is annexed."
15 N. Y. INs. L. § 142(3).
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example, the sound health clause usually provides the contract is
ineffective if on the date thereof the insured be not in sound health.
The breach of condition usually relates to the insured's health. The
16
scope of authority of the insurer's agent is also an important element.
A general agent solicits business, receives applications, delivers the
policy and collects premiums. Agents often assist in filling out
applications; and the insurer's medical examiner fills out the medical
questions. The general rule of agency is that knowledge of the agent
is imputed to the principal-insurer who is bound thereby.
Anything not part of the written insurance contract is extrinsic
evidence, whether it be parol testimony or an unattached application.
The identity of the party who offers such evidence and the purpose
thereof are essential to deciding whether it will be admitted.
The elements of estoppel as applied to insurance are': a breach
of condition by the insured, knowledge of such breach by the insurer's
agent,17 and delivery of the policy and collection of premiums. Under
such circumstances it would be a fraud on the insured not to pay
benefits to the beneficiary.
The case study outlined in the chart yields the general principle
that extrinsic evidence, be it an unattached application or parol testimony, will not be admitted. With respect to unattached applications, this principle is illustrated by the Mees case,' 8 the Archer case 19
and the BluesteiA case. 20 The Mees case also illustrates the conflicts
rule that the law of the state where the insurance contract is made
will govern the contract. 21 The Archer case shows that in 1916 a
liberal construction was given to § 58 to protect the insured; for
in that case the court excluded from evidence an unattached applica22
tion introduced by the defendant-insurer to prove fraud as a defense.
The court leaves open the question, however, whether proof of fraud
from sources outside the application will be admitted.
With respect to unattached applications, the general principle
above stated, finds its exceptions in the Abbott case 2 and the Hill
case. 24 In both instances, the defendant-insurer was allowed to
16 See Stephen I. Langmaid, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law; the
Agency Problems (1933) 21 CALiF. L. REV. 91-116.
17 "What is known to an agent with apparent authority to issue an effective
policy is known also to the company." Cardozo, Ch.J. in the Bible case, "e"
in Chart.
1s Case "a" in Chart.
19 Case "b" in Chart.
20 Case "i" in Chart.
21Joh, Hancock Mitt. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 57 Sup. Ct.

129 (1936) holds that § 58, excluding from evidence an unattached application,
is a rule of substance in New York, to which full faith and credit must be
given in other states.
22 See also Vozzella v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 242 App. Div. 800
(1934); Murphy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Amer., 83 Misc. 475, 145 N. Y.
Supp. 196 (1914).
23 Case "m" in Chart.

24

Case "o" in Chart
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I
Title of Case
(Citations
Below)

II
Was Application Attached
to Policy?

III
Representations
in
Application

a. M e e a v. Pittsburgh Life &
Trust Co.

No

Health habits; other
insurance

b.

Archer v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soec. of the U. S.

No

Prior physical condition; cause of parents' Death

c.

Bollard v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co.

Yes

Insured read policy;
statements a b o u t
physical condition
a n d insurance history are material to
risk and insurer
relies thereon

Medical examiner filled
o u t application

Physical conditions; other
insurance

d.

Minsker v. John
Ha n c o c k Mut.
Life Ins. Co.

Yes

Medical advice and
treatments in past
five years

Medical e xaminer filled
o u t application

Insured h ad
nephritis and
endocarditis

e.

Bible v. John
Hancock M u t.
Life Ins. Co.

Sound health on
date; void if treated
in institutions within two years; agent
cannot waive conditions

General

Insured had
manic depressive psychosis; in institution

General
agent filled
out application

Insured had
chronic neph.
ritis; material
to risk

No

/

f.

Salamida v.
John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co.

g.

Levic v. Metropi
Life Ins. Co.

IV
Clauses
in
Policy

Sound health; prior
illness

Sound health; void
if treated within
two years; insured
.wared to read policy

No

No written application
"physician

Agent cannot waive;
void if treated
by
f or ser-

r1il'

ious illness
two years.

A

h.

Fortunato - v.
Metrop. Life Ins.
Co.

No

i.

B l u e s t e in v.
Prud. Ins. Co.

No

3.

Stone v. Prud.
Ins. Co. of Amer.

Applicat i o n would
have been attached in
due course

Sound health

Sound health

Insured h a d
coronary
thrombosisand
glomerul o
nephritis

within

Void if insured not
in sound health on
date.

Physical defects;
illnesses prior accidents

VI
Breach
of
Condition
Health habits;
other insurance

No

rI

V
Scope
of
Agency

Medical examiner was
told false answers

Hospital.
ization and
medical treatment

General

Stomach cancer

U n s ound
health
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II
Was Application Attached
to Policy?

III
Representations
in
Application

IV
Clauses
in
Policy

V
Scope
of
Agency

VI
Breach
of
Condition

Agent cannot alter,
sound health; void
i f hospitalized o r
visited physician for
serious illness in
two years

General

Insured h a d
tuberculosis

k.

Hurley v. John
Hancock M u t.
Life Ins. Co.

No

1.

L a in Lk e v.
Metrop. Life Ins,
Co.

No

Sound health; not
treated by physician
in three years

Avoidance for unsound h e a 1 t h or
treatment f or serious illness

General

High blood
pressure

in. Abbott v. Prud.
I n s. C o. o f
Amer.

No

Clause: agent cannot bind insurer by
receiving
extrinsic
information

Sound health

General

C h r on Ic
myocarditis

n.

Tumelli v. Prud.
I n s. Co. o f
Amer.

Yes

Clause: limitations
on agent's authority

o.

Hill v. Metrop.
Life Ins. Co.

No

F a 1 a e answers on
kidney disease, unsound health, care
of physician

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Illness

Agent cannot waive

169 App. Div. 86, 154 N. Y. Supp. 660 (1915)
218 N. Y. 18, 112 N. E. 433 (1916)
228 N. Y. 521, 126 N. E. 900 (1920)
254 N. Y. 333, 173 N. E. 4 (1930)
256 N. Y. 458, 176 N. E. 838 (1931)
241 App. Div. 636, 266 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1933)
242 App. Div. 595, 275 N. Y. Supp. 908 (1934)
160 Misc. 918, 290 N. Y. Supp. 955 (1935)

General

Nephritis
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VII
Extrinsic Evidence
For What Purpose?

VIII
Do Elements
of Estoppel
Exist?

IX
Does Court
Admit Extrinsic Evidence?

X
Remarks

Type

Who Offers It?

Application

Defendantinsurer

To show breach

No

§ 58 excludes application; court assumes
contract was made in
New York.

Application

Defendantinsurer

To show fraud (intentional deception)
as a defense

No

§ 58 liberally c o n
strued to protect insured as legislature
intended

Parol

Plaintiffbeneficiary

To show truth was
told to medical examiner who wrote
the wrong answer;
that insured did not
read policy

Yes: But proof is
excluded

No

Court intimates parol
could be allowed as
defense to fraud.

Parol

Plaintiffbeneficiary'

To show truth was
told to agent who
wrote wrong answers

Yes: But proof is
excluded

No

§ 58 construed to
protect insurer also

Parol

Plaintiffbeneficiary

To show agent knew
truth

Yes: General agent
of insurer delivered
policy and collected
e
iums with
In em
owledge of breach
of condition

Yes

Agent entered mental institution to sell
insurance

Parol

Plaintiffbeneficiary

To show insurer's
agent knew of illness

Yes: General agent
of insurer delivered
policy and collected
tnremiums with
nowledge of breach
of condition

Yes

Insured was illiterate
and relied on agent

Parol

Plaintiffbeneficiary

To show waiver
condition by agent
" j.!

No: Insured concealed serious ill.
ness and told agent
only of minor ills.
Estoppel limited to
facts of each case

No

Court excludes parol
evidence of plaintiffbeneficiary trying to
show waiver. E vid e n c e of estoppel
very weak

Parol

Plaintiffbeneficiary

To show business
agent knew truth

Yes: If business
agent is considered,
No: If medical examiner is considered

No

When insurer tried
to find facts for itself, insured told outright lies

Application

Defendantinsurer

To show breach of
condition

Yes: Agent told of
ulcers and kidney
trouble, although
illness w a s really
cancer

No

Unsound health
k n o w n to insurer;
true illness immaterial

Application

Defendantinsurer

To show breach of
condition

Court intimates
to
p a r o I evidence
would
show estoppel
be excluded

Yes

Insured died before
policy issued
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VII

Extrinsic Evidence
Type

VIII

IX

Do Elements
of Estoppel
Exist?

Does Court
Admit Extrinsic Evidence?

X
Remarks

Who Offers It?

For What Purpose?

Parol

Plaintiffbeneficiary

To show agent knew
truth

Yes: Agent k n e w
insured confined in
institution f o r tuberculosis, delivered
policy and collected
premiums

Yes

Court says estoppel
can be shown; but
appeal centered about
jury instructions

Parol

Plaintiffbeneficiary

To show agent ben.
eficiary knew truth

Yes: Agent delivered policy and colI e e t e d premiums
w i t h knowledge of
breach

Yes

Disapproves Fortunato case: court says
if jury finds illness
is serious then parol
permitted to s h o w
estoppel

Application

Defendantinsurer

An admission that
insured knew agent's
limited authority

No: Insured not
lulled to sleep; had
notice in application
of agent's limited
authority

Yes

Notice precludes
estoppel

Parol

Plaintiffbeneficiary

To show agent knew
illness and ima d e
representations

No: Notice in a?plieation of agents
liedt
authority

No

§ 58 protects insurer;
notice p r e ci u d e s
estoppel

Application

Defendantinsurer

To show agent
lacked knowledge of
illness

No: Beneficiary proceeds on theory of
waiver

Yes

,hen beneficiary
sued, d e f e n dan t
e l e c t e d to avoid.
Agent's knowledge is
fact question

I
i.
157 Misc. 122, 282 N. Y. Supp. 440 (1935)
j. 268 N. Y. 91, 196 N. E. 754 (1935)
k. 247 App. Div. 547, 288 N. Y. Supp. 199 (1936)
1. 279 N. Y. 157, 18 N. E. (2d) 14 (1938)
in. 281 N. Y. 375, 24 N. E. 87 (1939)
n. Not officially reported; 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 306 (1940)
o. 259 App. Div. 278, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 753 (1940)
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submit unattached applications into evidence. This can be explained
by the purpose for which the evidence was given. In the Abbott case
it was submitted as an admission on the part of the insured that
he knew the agent's authority was limited against receiving extrinsic
information to bind the insurer. It would seem from this case that
if the insured is given notice in the application that the agent cannot
bind his insurer-principal, then the insured cannot win on the theory
of estoppel. In the Hill case the insurer was allowed to introduce
the unattached application to show its agent lacked knowledge of
the insured's illness, such knowledge being a fact question for the
jury. It seems the insurerer, by raising such a question, can thus
introduce the application.
We now consider how the principle, that extrinsic evidence will
25
not be admitted, applies to parol testimony. In the Bollard case,
the Minsker case, 26 the Fortunatocase, 27 and the Tuminelli case, 28 the

plaintiff-beneficiary submitted parol testimony to prove the insurer's
agent knew that the insured had breached conditions respecting illness. Such testimony was excluded, thus illustrating how the courts
interpret § 58 to protect the insurer as well as
the insured. 29 The
3
s0
exceptions to the principle are the Bible case the Salamida case, 1
32
33
the Hurley case, and the Lampke case
wherein the plaintiffbeneficiary was allowed to submit parol testimony to establish estoppel
by showing the insurer's general agent delivered the policy and collected premiums with knowledge of the insured's illness. Under such
facts the insurer is estopped from pointing to the breach of condition
by the insured.
Let us see why these cases were made exceptions to the rule.
In the Bible and Hurley cases, the over-zealous insurance agent invaded institutions confining mental and tuberculosis patients, respectively, and sold insurance to the inmates. In the Salamida case an
illiterate applicant relied on the agent who filled out the application
wrongly. In the Lampke case, the court, after holding that whether
high blood pressure is material to the risk is a fact question for

the jury, intimated that parol would be admitted to establish estoppel.
These cases show that only in extraordinary factual circumstances, where the insurer's agent takes an extremely unfair advantage
of the insured, will the courts allow parol to estop the insurer despite
§ 58. This seems to be the present state of the law in New York
and it illustrates how reluctant the courts are to extend the doctrine
25
26
27
28
29

Case
Case
Case
Case

"c" in Chart.
"d" in Chart.
"h" in Chart.

31
32

Case "f" in Chart.
Case "k" in Chart.

"n" in Chart.
See alsb case "g" in Chart.
30 Case "e" in Chart.
3 Case "I" in Chart.
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of estoppel. It34is ironical to recall that § 58 was intended to benefit
the beneficiary.
As has been shown, § 58 will not apply against the insurer if
the insured is notified in the application of the agent's limited authority, or if the insurer seeks to establish an admission, or if the insurer
tries to show lack of knowledge on the part of its agent of the breach
of condition. On the other hand, § 58 will not apply against the
insured unless exceptional facts exist. But the average set of facts
is not exceptional. When the insured seeks to establish estoppel
his usual case is that he told the agent he was sick and the agent
nevertheless sold him insurance, telling him everything is all right.
The insurer is even entitled to charge the jury that if the insured
had reasonable cause to believe the agent would not relate the truth
to his principal (i.e., the insurer) then the insurer is not bound by
the agent's knowledge.3 5 In the ordinary case, therefore, it is impossible for the beneficiary to introduce extrinsic evidence to establish
estoppel. Through the process of judicial legislation, § 58 has put
beneficiaries at such
a disadvantage that they would rather see it
36
ended or amended.

As stated in the Levic case, 37 estoppel should be limited to the
facts of each case; but the court should relax its stringent requirements. We now expect policyholders to read their long, small-typed,
mystifying contracts drawn up by the insurer's legal experts ;3 still
the theory of estoppel is forceful enough to override this consideration. If the insured tells outright lies as in the Fortunato case, or
conceals a serious illness as in the Levic case, and the evidence of
estoppel is generally weak, the court is justified in excluding. When,
however, the insurer picks an agent who fails to transmit information about the risk, and evidence of estoppel is fairly strong-albeit
lacking in exceptional and extraordinary equities-the courts should,
in the interests of justice, admit parol testimony offered by the beneficiary to estop the insurer from asserting a breach of condition known
to the agent.39 If the courts will not do this then let the legislature
clarify its intent by adding to § 142 (1) of the insurance law that
34 Chief Justice Cardozo said in the Bible case, "e" in Chart 'that § 58 was
intended to relieve the insured and beneficiaries claiming under him; that the
legislature had no design to make their situation harder.
35 Case "'k" in Chart.
38 If the beneficiary can prove fraud, accident or mistake he can get reformation: see Stark v. Masonic Life Ass'n, Supreme Court, N. Y. County,
Feb. 3, 1920, 180 N. Y. Supp. 235 (1920) ; Metropolitan Life. Ins. Co. v. Trilling,
194 App. Div. 178, 184 N. Y. Supp. 898 (1920).
3 Case 'Y' in Chart.
38 See Robert Mays Hennessy, Inmurance: Waiver and Estoppel (1933)
18 CoRN. L. Q. 605-607.
39 This proposal is mild when we consider how it can be counteracted by
the insurer with the jury charge in the Hurley case. See note 29 supra; case
"k"in Chart. In the Archer case, "b" in Chart, the court said on page 25,
"An unreasonable and unjust result was, presumptively, not intended by the
legislature and will be avoided through legitimate construction."
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the rule excluding information not attached to the policy does not
apply to an insured who makes a full disclosure to ,the insurer or
its agent of all facts material to the- risk, and pays premiums in
good faith.
JACOB I. LEFKOWITZ.

NEW CONCEPTS OF "ENEMY" IN THE "TRADING WITH THE ENEMY

ACT"

The purpose of economic warfare is to use any enemy-owned
property available to our advantage, and to prevent the enemy, so far
as possible, from deriving any advantage from foreign trade. The
idea of economic warfare as a vital complement to military-naval -war.
is not purely a modern development in United States policy. The
cases significant of the early legal problems involved in economic
warfare arose through the activities of our privateers in enforcing
prohibitions against trading with the enemy.' Those decisions clearly
indicate our country's vital concern with "trading with the enemy"
ever since its first wars.
When the United States entered the World War in 1917, Congress did not rely on the case law and procedure developed in and
2
since the War of 1812. It passed the Trading With the Enemy Act,
3
which, as amended and expanded, is the same act governing economic
offense and defense in the present war.
The United States from the beginning had adopted as a test of
enemy character, the idea that the "commercial domicile of a mer,chant at the time of capture of his goods determines the character
of those goods, whether hostile or neutral." 4 In the Trading With
the Enemy Act, residence and the place of doing business, rather
than nationality, are continued as the measure of enemy status. 5 Both,
1The San Jose Indiano, Fed. Cas. No. 12,322 (C. C. Mass. 1814), aff'd

.14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 208, 4 L. ed. 73 (1816) ; The Mary and Susan, 14 U. S.

(1 Wheat.) 46, 4 L. ed. 32 (N. Y. 1816); The Mary, Fed. Cas. No. 9,184
(C. C. R. I. 1813), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 12 U. S. (8 Cranch) 388,
3 L. ed. 599 (1814) ; The Frances, 12 U. S. (8 Cranch) 335, 3 L. ed. 581 (R.I.
1814) ; The Venus, 12 U. S. (8 Cranch) 253, 3 L. ed. 553 (Mass. 1814) ; The
St. Lawrence, Fed. Cas. No. 12,232 (C. C. N. H. 1813); The Ann Green, Fed.
Cas. No. 414 (C. C. Mass. 1812).
2 Act Oct. 6, 1917, c. 106, 40 STAT. 411, 50 U. S. C. A. App.
3 FIRST WAR PowERs AcT, 55 STAT. 839, 50 U.

S. C. A. App. § 616 et seq.

(1941)).
4 The Frances, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5034, 673, aff'd, 8 Cranch 363, 3
(1814).
5 Sec. 2, supra note 3. "The word 'enemy' as used herein, shall
to mean for the purposes of such trading and of this act-(a) Any
partnership, or other body of individuals of any nationality, resident

L. ed. 590
be deemed
individual,
within the

